I. INTRODUCTION
In February 1999, I became employed with Cottonwood, Inc., a service provider for adults with developmental disabilities. I worked with women who lived together in a group home. I was responsible for assisting these women in living their lives as they saw fit. As my job title changed over the years, my responsibility remained primarily the same: helping someone with a developmental disability live the way they wanted. In addition to a greater understanding of this role, I also became aware of the structure in which this role exists. Many of the people I worked with were eligible for Medicaid services, and received these services through one of Kansas's home and community-based waiver programs.
Eventually, I left Cottonwood to work at Kansas Advocacy and Protective Services, Inc. (now the Disability Rights Center of Kansas). There, I discovered that an extensive waiting list for home and community-based services inhibits access to these services. I also discovered that there were a variety of waiver programs, and some difficulty in not only qualifying for the programs, but in getting off the waiting lists and actually receiving the program services.
Consider the following scenario: Jane Smith has a disability which qualifies her for institutional care, such as placement in a nursing home or state hospital. After spending time in this institution, a medical professional determines that with enough staff support-attendants to assist with daily living needs-Jane could be in a community setting like a group home or even her own apartment. Jane has a right to services in the most integrated setting. Jane's family helps her locate an appropriate place nearby which can accommodate Jane. Unfortunately, there is not an open space on the Medicaid waiver program to fund Jane's placement. Jane cannot work because her disability is severe, and there is no other way to raise the funds necessary to support her in a community setting. What exactly can Jane do in order to move out of the institution and into KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 a community-living situation? This Comment will revisit Jane's dilemma throughout its analysis. Under the New Freedom Initiative, 1 the federal government is pouring money into state Medicaid programs to facilitate the movement of Americans with disabilities from institutions into community settings. 2 Steps must be taken to ensure those individuals' rights throughout the process. The current § 1983 Medicaid jurisprudence offers insight into the present civil rights dilemma arising from these questions: How can individuals enforce their Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) right to services in the most integrated setting while receiving Medicaid-provided health care without imposing undue financial hardship on individual states? Will Medicaid waiver programs and the courts erode protections given to people with disabilities by the ADA? How do the ADA and § 1983 Medicaid litigation work incongruously in ultimate service provision?
While the circuits continue to decide and argue over which provisions of Medicaid confer rights to individuals, states continue to change their Medicaid plans implementing the federal statute. Most states use § 1396n(c) waivers to provide home and community-based services.
A growing number of states are also implementing demonstration projects using § 1315 waivers. The waiver programs and demonstration projects allow states greater flexibility in reaching the goals of Medicaid. However, this flexibility also changes a number of requirements-including eligibility requirements-for Medicaid recipients. In some cases, this might mean an increased recipient pool. In other cases, this might mean a limited service in a single portion of the state. Regardless of the actual impact of the program or demonstration project, there are additional legal impacts for Medicaid recipients.
This Comment argues that as states seek cost-effective ways to implement Medicaid provisions and provide services, states also endanger the fragile legal right individuals have to a private cause of action under § 1983 to enforce their access to prompt health care services 6 Although the ADA was enacted twenty-five years after Medicaid, the ADA's requirements uniquely interact with Medicaid-something the courts have been loathe to address.
A. An Overview of Medicaid and Medicaid Waiver Programs
Medicaid is a program administered by the states and funded jointly by the states and the federal government.
7 Over fifty-five million people are enrolled in Medicaid; approximately fourteen percent of these enrollees have disabilities. 8 While Congress created Medicaid at the same time it created Medicare, the nature of the "entitlement" to Medicaid is less clear than the entitlement to Medicare. 9 Total Medicaid expenditures "will exceed $300 billion" in 2006.
10 Over one-third of these Medicaid dollars are spent on long-term care services: "services for both elderly and non-elderly persons in institutional settings and in home and community-based setting [s] ."
11 Looking at both general state plan requirements and the waiver programs states use to provide long-term care provides background for the present legal conundrum.
State Plan Requirements
In order for states to receive federal Medicaid dollars, each state must submit a state plan for medical assistance which meets numerous requirements. 12 States have "been permitted a great deal of discretion as to the populations that they cover" and "enjoy a great deal of latitude as to which benefits they cover" with their individual programs. 13 The most applicable of these state plan requirements to this Comment are found in requires that the payment for medical assistance be enough to guarantee provider availability to Medicaid recipients equal to that available to the general population.
22
"Medical assistance" is discussed throughout each of these provisions and has a particularly important meaning in Medicaid litigation. The Act defines medical assistance to mean "payment of part or all of the cost of the following care and services" for eligible individuals. 23 The majority of courts specifically hold that this definition of medical assistance includes only the "payment," not the "provision" of medical services. Generally, Medicaid operates like a typical health insurance program-once services have been provided, the provider is reimbursed under a fee schedule ("fee-for-service"). However, for beneficiaries with complex medical needs, this structure can be cumbersome and costprohibitive. Congress first established the waiver programs with the enactment of § 1396n(c) in 1981. 25 While only six states operated waiver programs during the first year, 26 the availability of home and community-based services represented a move from institutional care toward the independent living model of care for people with disabilities.
27
The primary types of waiver authority discussed here (HCBS and Demonstration Project waivers) are granted within the discretion of the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 28 Both of these waiver programs require budget neutrality: that is, the federal cost of Medicaid for a particular state under a waiver program cannot exceed the cost of Medicaid without the waiver program in that state.
29 To achieve this, states apply for waiver programs to cover a certain number of individuals and fill these slots as space (and funding) becomes available. Until space is available, eligible individuals remain on waiting lists.
a. HCBS Waivers
Home and community-based services waivers (HCBS waivers), found in § 1396n(c), allow for the provision of medical assistance to 25 44 The impact of the DRA generally, and Money Follows the Person in particular, will be discussed more thoroughly in Part IV.A-B. However, it is important to note that both of the DRA waivers differ from the HCBS and Demonstration Project waivers in that they do not require budget neutrality while offering the same freedom from regulation as Demonstration Project waivers. 44. RUDOWITZ & SCHNEIDER, supra note 29, at 13. In addition to the HCBS and Demonstration Project waivers and the DRA waiver programs, waivers exist under § 1396n(b). This class of waivers can be used to promote cost-effectiveness and efficiency and allows states to waive a variety of provisions of the State Plan requirements. However, these waivers are fairly similar to HCBS waivers and, more importantly, have not been analyzed under § 1983 or in comparison with the ADA. Thus a review of these waivers would not be useful in evaluating the waiver programs' impact on individual rights.
45. RUDOWITZ & SCHNEIDER, supra note 29, at 13.
The Americans with Disabilities Act
The Americans with Disabilities Act 46 prohibits discrimination against people with disabilities in a number of ways. Of importance here is the prohibition of discrimination by public entities: "Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 47 The enacting regulations further clarify that public entities must "administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities." 48 When states administer their Medicaid programs, according to the ADA, the states have an obligation not to discriminate against qualified individuals with disabilities.
The Act defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as: "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices . . . meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity."
49 Disability means "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual." 50 Thus, Medicaid should serve its eligible participants whose impairment "substantially limits one or more . . . major life activities" in "the most integrated setting appropriate."
With the ADA, Congress recognized that people with disabilities had been historically isolated and segregated, and "such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem."
51
This language lays the foundation to view the "most integrated setting" requirement as a way to move past a specific form of discrimination faced by people with disabilities.
46. 42 U.S.C. § § 12101 to 12300 (2000). 47. Id. § 12132. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act also prohibits discrimination against people with disabilities by any group receiving federal funding. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000). While additional time could be spent on this topic, the § 504 analysis would be similar to the ADA analysis in its present application and will not be discussed in this Comment.
48 The ADA was passed in 1990-"an earthshaking event for disabled people." 52 The prohibitions against discrimination, as described above, were in response to the continuous exclusion of people with disabilities from everyday activities like using public buildings, dining out, going to the movies, and even working. 53 Disability rights activists had shown their outrage about years of unnecessary institutionalization, 54 and celebrated when the Court announced its decision in Olmstead.
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring
Two women diagnosed with mental retardation and mental illness had voluntarily admitted themselves into a Georgia hospital for treatment. 55 One woman remained there three years after stabilizing.
56
The other woman remained there two years after stabilizing. 57 The first woman filed suit two years into her stay invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § § 12131-34; the second woman intervened with identical claims. 58 In response to the original complaint, Georgia raised a cost-based defense, arguing that "it was already using all available funds to provide services to other persons with disabilities," and that "requiring immediate transfers [to less restrictive environments] in cases of this order would 'fundamentally alter' the State's activity." 59 Ultimately, these women began receiving community-based treatment, but their case still received review by the Supreme Court.
60
The Supreme Court concluded, solely on ADA grounds, that the institutionalization these women faced was prohibited discrimination: "Specifically, we confront the question whether the proscription of discrimination may require placement of persons with mental disabilities in community settings rather than in institutions. The answer, we hold, is a qualified yes." 61 The Court qualified its decision by stating that placement in a community setting should be made if it "can be reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources available to 52 If, for example, the State were to demonstrate that it had a comprehensive, effectively working plan for placing qualified persons with mental disabilities in less restrictive settings, and a waiting list that moved at a reasonable pace not controlled by the State's endeavors to keep its institutions fully populated, the reasonable-modifications standard would be met.
64
This "comprehensive, effectively working plan" has since been referred to as an Olmstead plan.
65 Although Georgia's Medicaid waiver program was not at issue, this language has been used by other courts in determining whether states are discriminating against individuals with disabilities who continue to reside in institutions despite the existence of waiver programs designed to increase community placement.
If community-based services are cost-effective 66 and institutional care is discriminatory, 67 why is there still a fight-evidenced by yet another initiative to end unnecessary institutionalization 68 -to keep people with disabilities from moving out of restrictive environments? While Olmstead represents a victory for people with disabilities, 69 it has not worked with Medicaid as advocates hoped. 70 Perhaps states are still concerned that "the savings they currently enjoy from these [homebased] programs would evaporate if such help is made widely available," and that people with disabilities will come "out of the woodwork." 
A. The Blessing Test
In order to successfully enforce a federal right using § 1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate the following elements. Congress must have intended the statutory provision conferring the right to benefit the plaintiff. 91 The statutory right cannot be so "'vague and amorphous' that its enforcement would strain judicial competence. Again the court looked to the statute's use of "shall" and "must" in both provisions and found that these terms were "rights-creating terms" with an "individual focus." 123 The court stated, "it is evident . . . that the statutory language, despite countervailing structural elements of the statute, unambiguously confers rights which plaintiffs can enforce." 124 The Third Circuit found that both the Reasonable Promptness and Quality of Care Provisions met the Gonzaga 126 The case involved pharmaceutical providers seeking enforcement of individual rights under the Equal Access Provision, claiming rates for pharmaceuticals would be insufficient under a proposed scheme.
127
The Equal Access Provision requires state Medicaid plans to provide "such methods and procedures relating to the utilization of, and the payment for, care and services available under the plan . . . to assure that payments are . . . sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services are available under the plan" to the extent the services are available to the general population of that area.
128
Specifically reviewing the provision under Gonzaga, the court found "no 'rights creating language'" and "no discrete class of beneficiaries." 129 The court held that the statute was not particular enough to grant individual enforcement rights. 130 Once again no waiver program was in issue or discussed throughout.
After a review of the non-waiver § In 1993, New Hampshire had sought and received an HCBS model waiver to provide home and community-based services to individuals with acquired brain disorders. 132 The model waiver "differs from regular waivers primarily in that model waivers . . . may not serve more than 200 individuals at any one time."
133 From 1993 until the decision date in 2002, New Hampshire had consistently requested additional waiver slots, but was still under the 200 person limit. 134 The Plaintiffs in Bryson were waiver-eligible individuals that had been placed on a waiting list. 135 They claimed that the number of waiver slots should be "as many slots as the number of applicants, up to a limit of 200," and that when a waiver slot became available, the slots were not filled within a reasonable time.
136
The court reasoned against a requirement of at least 200 slots in the model waiver program, 137 but more importantly, the court commented on how the Reasonable Promptness Provision applied to the waiver program. Specifically, the court reasoned: "Those patients who are on the waiting list and for whom slots are available are, we think, 'eligible' under the statute such that they are entitled to reasonable promptness."
138 This means that in order to receive reasonably prompt medical assistance under New Hampshire's HCBS waiver, an individual must already be on a waiting list for waiver services and a waiver slot must be available. This decision came after Olmstead, but the Court did not address discrimination claimed under the ADA.
139
In 2005, the Ninth Circuit handled a combination case in which Plaintiffs, a group of individuals with developmental disabilities, claimed violations of the Equal Access Provision of Medicaid, as well as discrimination under the ADA.
140
More specifically, the Plaintiffs alleged that "because California pays wages to community-based service providers participating in the HCBS waiver program at a lower rate than The Plaintiffs were attempting to engage the court in analyzing a Medicaid waiver program in conjunction with the ADA through the Equal Access Provision.
In examining the § 1983 claim, the court used recently-decided Gonzaga along with the reasoning in Long Term Care Pharmacy v. Ferguson to find that the Equal Access Provision did not include rightscreating language. 143 The court recognized pre-Gonzaga decisions which did find a § 1983-enforceable right in this provision, but held that "there is nothing in the text of § 30(A) that unmistakably focuses on recipients or providers as individuals. Moreover, the flexible administrative standards embodied in the statute do not reflect a Congressional intent to provide a private remedy for their violation."
144
Given the overall agreement by the circuits that the Equal Access Provision is not § 1983-enforceable regardless of the waiver, this result is not surprising.
145
As for the discrimination claims, the court found that the existence of an acceptable "Olmstead Plan" precluded mandating increased home and community-based services, a "'fundamental alteration' of a comprehensive, working plan for deinstitutionalization."
146 This same line of reasoning was used by the Ninth Circuit in dismissing institutionalization-discrimination claims in Washington. Plaintiffs, people with developmental disabilities on Colorado's HCBS waiver program waiting list, sought to enforce access to the HCBS services through the Reasonable Promptness Provision, the Quality of Care Provision, and the Equal Access Provision.
155
The court, for purposes of this case, assumed enforceability of the Reasonable Promptness and Quality of Care Provisions under § 1983, but rejected claims under both because "medical assistance" is defined as "payment for, but not provision of, services."
156 Using this definition in connection with these two provisions, the court found:
[T]he Medicaid Act requires any state participating in Medicaid to pay promptly and evenhandedly for medical services when the state is presented with the bill. If that is all the statute requires, then the plaintiffs have no claim: they are on a waiting list for services, not a waiting list for payment for services.
157
The Tenth Circuit went on to hold that no enforceable right existed under the Equal Access Provision of Medicaid.
158
The § 1983 Medicaid waiver cases do not differ dramatically from the non-waiver cases. Yet, the interpretation of the Reasonable Promptness Provision in this line of cases creates a particular barrier. An individual eligible for waiver program services has the right to reasonably prompt payment of those services and, possibly, reasonably prompt access to a slot once a slot becomes available. Regardless of 151. Id. at 1161 (discussing § 1396a(a)(10) generally as opposed to § 1396a(a)(10)(B) specifically).
152. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (17) While children can often be served by waiver programs, 165 the EPSDT language guarantees a broad array of services without requiring waiver access and has been held to contain a right to those services enforceable by § 1983. 165. Kansas provides waiver services to children with disabilities through the Mental Retardation/Developmental Disability Waiver, the Physical Disability Waiver, the Technology Assistance Waiver, and the Severe Emotional Disturbance Waiver.
Kansas services (provided in a facility, a home, or other setting) recommended by a physician . . . for the maximum reduction of physical or mental disability and restoration of an individual to the best possible functional level" for children twenty-one and under. 167 None of these cases address EPSDT in the context of a waiver program and the cases conflict over enforceability of the Equal Access Provisions and over the definition of medical assistance.
Westside Mothers and Pediatric Specialty, though both finding EPSDT an enforceable right, agree on little else. Westside Mothers clearly limits medical assistance to financial assistance and denies § 1983 enforceability of the Equal Access Provision. 168 Pediatric Specialty, on the other hand, broadly interprets the Equal Access Provision to be individually enforceable under § 1983, and rather than limit "medical assistance," the Court found the Plaintiffs to have "clearly established rights to provide and receive medically necessary health care."
169
OKAAP does not explicitly find EPSDT as an enforceable right but rather continues the Tenth Circuit's conclusions in Mandy R. that medical assistance is only financial payment for medical services and EPSDT is just a form of medical assistance.
170
In district courts around the country, EPSDT continues to be enforced even for innovative services like "wraparound services"-the practice of serving a child in each aspect of his or her life without compartmentalizing need, thus "wrapping" the services "around" the child. In Katie A. v. Bonta, the District Court for the Central District of California acknowledged a § 1983 right to enforcement of EPSDT services, 171 and concluded that the EPSDT statute provided for medically necessary wraparound services and therapeutic foster care.
172
In the District of Massachusetts, children with severe emotional disturbance were able to access EPSDT services via § 1983 for comprehensive assessment services. 173 While the interaction between waiver programs and EPSDT has not been clearly addressed by the courts, an enforceable right to EPSDT has not met the same resistance, and cannot be waived in the same way, as the other state plan requirements. Furthermore, EPSDT language is more mandatory than precatory, and has withstood 167. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (13) The most important difference inherent in § 1983 litigation involving Medicaid waiver cases lies in the interpretation of the Reasonable Promptness Provision. Even setting aside the extreme nature of Mandy R., 175 the Reasonable Promptness Provision has primarily been interpreted to mean that no more than a reasonable time should pass between the opening of a waiver slot to the filling of that slot by a qualified beneficiary. This interpretation-combined with the fact that no appellate court has found discrimination in a limited waiver program-shows that while an individual receiving typical fee-forservice Medicaid services has a right to reasonably prompt medical assistance, an individual qualified to receive waiver services only has a right to reasonably prompt medical assistance once a slot on the waiver becomes available. There is no requirement to make waiver services available for an individual if, systemically, the state in question has an Olmstead-plan.
Each of the waiver programs discussed in a § 1983 context were HCBS waivers, which still require compliance with a majority of the state plan requirements. 176 Perhaps no § 1983 Demonstration Project waiver cases have been published because waiving all state plan requirements waives any § 1983-enforceable right.
One possible bright spot in this analysis lies with the EPSDT guarantee for children. Unlike other provisions of Medicaid, EPSDT cannot be waived by HCBS waivers.
177 Unfortunately, EPSDT might be able to be waived by Demonstration Project waiver programs or the new DRA waiver programs. 178 Reconsider Jane's dilemma in light of § 1983 Medicaid cases. As discussed under the Olmstead-waiver program construction, Jane cannot use the ADA to enforce her right to services in a more integrated setting so long as the state she lives in has made a commitment to deinstitutionalization, as evidenced by an Olmstead-type plan.
181 If Jane's state has a waiver program to address her particularized need, she can only use § 1983 to enforce reasonably prompt access to services once a slot in that waiver program becomes available.
Considering the wide array of new and existing waiver programs, it is extremely unlikely that Jane lives in a state without a waiver program for which she is eligible. 182 But perhaps in that unlikely situation, Jane would be able to prove discrimination under the ADA. Even so, would Jane be able to transfer her institutional Medicaid to a community placement without an existing waiver program? Olmstead did not answer this question-Georgia did have a waiver program in place for which the Plaintiffs were eligible. 183 The Court did state, though, that states must provide community placement when community placement is not only appropriate and unopposed by the affected person, but "can be reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources available to the State and the needs of others with mental disabilities." 184 The reason waiver programs were created in the first place was to account for Medicaid's inability to efficiently serve individuals requiring an array of services.
It seems that not much has been accomplished in securing an enforceable right to reasonably prompt Medicaid services-a service of public accommodation-in the most integrated setting as required by the ADA. Commentators argue whether any Medicaid provision should be enforceable with § 1983. 185 The definition of "medical assistance" limits what a Medicaid entitlement actually is: payment for services, not provision of services. 186 Medicaid reform is pushing toward more waivers and managed care. 187 This outlook, combined with the bleak analysis of existing individual rights to de-institutionalization presented above, necessitates innovation.
A. The Lankford Answer

Lankford v. Sherman
In response to Missouri's state budget crisis, its legislature revised a statute which provided durable medical equipment (DME) as a standalone benefit to all Medicaid recipients. 188 As § 1983-enforceable rights to Medicaid erode under the increased use of waiver programs, and the ADA's de-institutionalization mandate is seen as systemic rather than as an individual right, could the Supremacy Clause breathe new life into the disability rights movement in the legal community? At this time, it is unclear what leeway courts will give plaintiffs in this new realm of pleading. However, neither Lankford nor Equal Access addressed a waiver program problem. Given the substantial control states have over Medicaid programs in general, and the waiver programs specifically, it seems unlikely that a court will find state statutes conflicting with federal Medicaid law amid the enactment of waiver programs-programs designed to operate outside of federal regulation. 206 
B. Further Devolution
In 1997, the Balanced Budget Act "appreciably lessened federal control over state managed-care programs." 207 As states increase their governing capacity-"the ability to formulate coherent, creative, plausible policy and carry it out efficiently, effectively, and accountably"-more administrative control rests with the states, as opposed to the federal government, in Medicaid's administration.
208 This is clearly evidenced by further ceding of Medicaid control to the states through the DRA.
However, federal control, especially over "eligibility and benefits," can protect Medicaid beneficiaries from "states' reacting to bad economic times by cutting Medicaid programs." 209 With over one-third of all Medicaid dollars being spent on long-term care for people with disabilities and the elderly, 210 disability rights advocates should carefully follow how Medicaid programs are being restructured at both the state and federal level.
The Deficit Reduction Act
As previously mentioned, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 made additional changes to Medicaid. Significantly, "[t]he DRA also creates two new waiver authorities" and "allows states to implement some policies that would have required a waiver from the Secretary before the passage of the DRA." 211 The DRA is intended to produce close to five billion dollars in "net savings to the federal government over the next five years" through its wide array of changes to federal Medicaid. KANSAS 219 These grants are designed to help states increase home and community-based services by eliminating the barriers between types of funding-typical fee-for-service Medicaid and Medicaid waiver programs. 220 Ultimately, more Medicaid dollars will go toward home and community-based services. This certainly is an idealistic goalinstitutionalization is discriminatory, and providing additional HCBS services satisfies more people with disabilities and their desire to live in an integrated setting. 221 But the following question remains unanswered: What happened to the right to services in the most integrated setting? This right is clearly protected by the ADA. An attempt to enforce this right was made in
Olmstead. Yet neither the ADA nor § 1983 have been able to make this right enforceable under Medicaid-the primary funding source for home and community-based services.
Will individuals be able to remain in the community if and when the Medicaid funds are eliminated or eligibility-determinations are greatly altered? These are both real possibilities when operating state Medicaid programs outside federal regulations. Without the cost-containment structure of previous waiver programs, will Money Follows the Person grants lead to the ultimate bankrupting of the Medicaid system? While this type of panicked thinking appears contrary to the aims under which Money Follows the Person was passed, the absence of regulatory oversight, combined with the present entitlement problem for home and community-based services, presents valid fears for individuals relying on these very grants to finally experience freedom.
C. Eliminating Traditional Medicaid?
Professor Timothy Stoltzfus Jost has argued for a complete overhaul of the American health care system. 222 The new system would "wholly replace" Medicaid, and Professor Jost asserts that "few would mourn its passing."
223 Considering Medicaid's expense, complexity, and lessening entitlement, Professor Jost might be right. However, while sweeping political changes are difficult to make, making them in a way that keeps a safety net under the very people Medicaid is attempting to serve would be next to impossible.
Professor Jost refers to Medicaid as "fifty different programs [dealing] with what is essentially a national problem." 224 However, when taking all of the waiver programs into account, alongside the traditional fee-for-service structure, there are closer to five hundred partially federally-funded programs serving one-sixth of the American populous. Considering further that most home and community-based services are provided to only fourteen percent of Medicaid enrollees, over four hundred programs serve two percent of Americans. Medicaid's devolution, completely overhauling Medicaid offers more protection for individual rights. Perhaps Americans are not ready to view health care as a universal, human right. However, when health care is so intertwined with daily life-such as whether a person resides in a nursing home or has a right to receive health care in their own homeindividual rights cannot be ignored.
If legislation today could enjoy the ease of passage the ADA received in 1990, Congress might be able to solve the present dilemma. Congress could amend the Medicaid Act to require reasonably prompt access to waiver services, not just the payment of those services once a waiver slot is available. Congress could clarify the ADA's prohibition against discrimination by public entities to discuss this provision's impact on public health care programs, like Medicaid.
V. CONCLUSION
For most people, civil rights-the right to vote, the right to due process, the right to freedom from religious, gender-based, racial, and age-based discrimination-are considered individual rights. However, after recognizing institutionalization as a form of discrimination faced primarily by people with disabilities, the courts and Congress have allowed institutionalization's continued existence. Until Congress introduces entitlement language into the waiver programs, or until the courts enforce the ADA more strictly and without caveats, a freedom from institutionalization cannot be guaranteed for people with disabilities while receiving adequate health care.
Traditional § 1983 litigation no longer offers the same enforcement of access to the Medicaid entitlement due, in part, to the cost-saving mechanisms of the Medicaid Act. The ADA, though prohibiting discrimination in the administration of public programs, has not been able to offer freedom from discrimination (in the form of institutionalization) due to the systemic-basis language of Olmstead. When analyzed together, courts attempting to "navigate . . . the murky waters between two statutory bodies: Medicaid and the Americans with Disabilities Act" 234 have received no assistance from the Supreme Court. Granting certiorari to a § 1983 Medicaid case could potentially assist lower courts, but it could also amplify the Olmstead problem. Olmstead was decided outside of the Medicaid framework and solely on ADA grounds. If a similar case is decided solely on Medicaid grounds and KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
outside an ADA framework, it seems plausible that the two decisions could conflict in application, much like the conflicting applications of the individual statutes. While attempting to resolve this problem in the existing legal landscape is not an easy task, advocates cannot focus their attention in only one arena. Additional attention must be paid to the devolution of Medicaid and to the additional consequences from the passage of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 and the implementation of Money Follows the Person. Will we continue to see an erosion of civil rights for people with disabilities? Can we really start all over with public health care?
Remember Jane's dilemma: she could, with reasonable support, live on her own outside of an institution. It is more cost-effective for her state, as well as more desirable for Jane. Yet Jane is only guaranteed institutional care at this time despite the widespread movement toward community-based services. Jane's individual right has been limited by the interpretation of the ADA's anti-discrimination mandates, and further constrained by Medicaid's devolution to the states.
Laws do not operate in a vacuum. People with disabilities should be able to realize and enforce their civil rights, which were finally recognized with the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act. More importantly, people with disabilities should no longer have to face the threat of institutionalization as the only guaranteed means to receive adequate health care from a public program. The "serious and pervasive social problem" of discriminating against people with disabilities through segregation and isolation 235 must end.
